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A B S T R A C T
The?size?of?migration?ﬂows?to?Germany?from?other?European?countries?surged?in?the?aftermath?of?the?2010?European?crisis,?and?this?paper?explores?the?main?
determinants?of?this?large?increase.?International?migrants?tend?to?move?more?than?once?in?their?lives,?and?migration?episodes?to?Germany?make?no?exception?in?
this?respect.?This?paper?explores?some?relevant?implications?of?this?simple?observation?for?the?estimation?of?gravity?models,?which?is?done?here?with?bilateral?
monthly?migration?data.?We?demonstrate? that? ignoring? the? sequential?nature?of?migration?decisions?gives? rise? to?multilateral? resistance? to?migration,? thus?
substan-tially?biasing?the?estimates.?We?also?show?that?the?expectations?about?future?economic?conditions?at?origin?signiﬁcantly?inﬂuence?bilateral?migration?
ﬂows?to?Germany.
1. Introduction
Germany has been receiving large and growing gross migration
ﬂows from other countries in the European Union in recent years,
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totaling at around 4.4 million between January 2006 and September
2014,4 and contributing to make it the second largest migrant des-
tination in the OECD by the end of this period (OECD, 2014). While
such a surge is certainly related to the Eastern enlargement of the
EU and to the economic crisis that has hit several European coun-
tries, a credible identiﬁcation of the role played by institutional
and economic factors has to be based on a suitable representa-
tion of the location-decision problem that would-be migrants face.
Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2013) have shown that the
estimation of gravity equations that are based on a random util-
ity model with distributional assumptions à la McFadden (1974)
produces biased estimates if location-speciﬁc utility is imperfectly
modeled. A speciﬁc reason why this could occur is connected to
the fact that migrants can move more than once throughout their
lives. As Dustmann and Görlach (2015) observe, “permanent migra-
tions are — and possibly always have been — the exception rather
than the rule” (p. 491), and indeed the outﬂow of EU immigrants
from Germany between January 2006 and September 2014 stood at
around 3.1 million (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015), in line with the
observation that “gross migration in one direction [is] the best single
4 The bilateral migration ﬁgures are derived from a special data provision by the
Federal Statistical Oﬃce (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2015).
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indicator of the amount of backﬂow” (Sjaastad, 1962, p. 81).5 This,
in turn, implies that the attractiveness of a country at one point in
time also depends not just on the expectations about its own future
economic conditions, but also on the value associated to possible fur-
ther moves, provided that migrants do not take myopic decisions.
This sequential nature of migration decisions is typically disregarded
when lying the theoretical basis of gravity models to be estimated on
aggregate data.
We derive the speciﬁcation that we bring to the data from a
dynamic discrete choice model to describe the location-decision
problem that individuals face at each point in time, building upon the
model that Kennan andWalker (2011) employed to describe individ-
ual internal migration decisions. This derivation reveals that canon-
ical speciﬁcations based on static micro-foundations with restrictive
distributional assumptions produce biased estimates, as in Bertoli
and Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2013), unless (i) current migra-
tion decisions are based on a myopic behavior or (ii) the world is
frictionless, i.e., there are no migration costs.
The gravity equation based on the proposed dynamic micro-
foundations presents a multi-factor error structure (Bai, 2009,
Pesaran, 2006), which informs the choice of the estimation approach
that we adopt, characterized by being less data-demanding than the
ones proposed by Artuç et al. (2010) and Arcidiacono and Miller
(2011).
The estimation of the gravity equation with monthly bilateral
migration data reveals that the movements in the unemployment
rate and the migration policy changes that were introduced over
our sample period exert a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the size of the
bilateral migration ﬂows to Germany. Concretely, a 10% increase in
the unemployment rate at origin is associated with a 5.4% increase
in the bilateral migration rate, while the EU accession and the end
of the seven-year transitional arrangements adopted by Germany
towards new EU members states are estimated to increase the bilat-
eral migration rate by 183% and 36% respectively. The estimates
that we obtain with a canonical static micro-foundation, i.e., a static
RUM model with i.i.d EVT-1 disturbances, are signiﬁcantly biased,
and the direction of the bias in the various coeﬃcients is in line
with the ones due to multilateral resistance to migration (Bertoli
and Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2013) and by the prevailing pat-
tern of correlation in the data: the unemployment rate estimates
are upward biased while the policy effects estimates are downward
biased.
We also attempt to directly control for the confounding effect
due to changing expectations about the future economic conditions
at origin through two proxies, namely a synthetic measure of con-
sumers’ conﬁdence and the yields on 10-year sovereign bonds on
the secondary market. These two proxies, which we introduce for
the ﬁrst time in the migration literature, signiﬁcantly inﬂuence bilat-
eral migration ﬂows to Germany in the expected direction, but their
inclusion is per se insuﬃcient to remove the bias on the coeﬃcients
of the other variables in the canonical static speciﬁcation. This neg-
ative result is in line with our dynamic discrete choice model, as
the current bilateral migration rate depends in a complex and non-
linear way on the expectations about future economic conditions in
all potential locations, and not in the origin country only.
This paper draws from three main strands of literature. First,
the literature on the determinants of international migration ﬂows
5 See also Bijwaard et al. (2014) and Bandiera et al. (2013) for evidence on the
incidence of temporary migration in different geographical and historical contexts;
Artuç and Özden (2014) provide evidence that a substantial share of migrants have
been residing outside their country of birth just before moving to the United States,
thus suggesting that return is not the only available option at the end of a temporary
migration experience.
(Beine et al., 2011, 2013, 2016; Belot and Ederveen, 2012; Belot and
Hatton, 2012; Bertoli et al., 2011; Clark et al., 2007; Grogger and
Hanson, 2011; Lewer and den Berg, 2008; Mayda, 2010; Pedersen et
al., 2008), and more speciﬁcally on the papers that have relaxed the
distributional assumptions on the underlying RUM model (Bertoli
and Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2015; Bertoli et al., 2013; Ortega
and Peri, 2013), and those that have analyzed the determinants of
migration to Germany, mainly in the context of the Eastern enlarge-
ment of the EU (Boeri and Brücker, 2001; Brücker and Siliverstovs,
2006; Fertig, 2001; Flaig, 2001; Sinn et al., 2001; Vogler and Rotte,
2000). Second, the literature on static (de Palma and Kilani, 2007;
McFadden, 1974, 1978; Small and Rosen, 1981) and dynamic dis-
crete choice models (Arcidiacono andMiller, 2011; Artuç et al., 2010;
Kennan andWalker, 2011; Pessino, 1991). Third, the literature on the
estimation of linear models with a common factor structure in the
error term (Bai, 2009; Pesaran, 2006; Pesaran and Tosetti; 2011).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2
presents a RUM model that describes the sequential location-
decision problem that potential migrants face. Section 3 introduces
our sample and data sources, and it also provides the relevant
descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents the results of our economet-
ric analysis. Section 5 draws the main conclusions of the paper.
2. A sequential model of migration
We consider a set of inﬁnitely lived agents, each of them denoted
by i, located in country j that have to choose their preferred location
from a set of countries D, with #D = n, in period t. The utility of
opting for country k at time t is given by:
Uijkt ≡ wkt − cjk + bVt+1(k) + 4ikt (1)
This depends on: (i) a deterministic instantaneous component
wkt, (ii) a deterministic component cjk that describes the cost of mov-
ing from j to k,6 (iii) the discounted value, with time discount factor
b < 1, of the expected utility Vt+1(k) from optimally choosing the
preferred location from time t + 1 onwards conditional upon being
in k at time t, and on (iv) a stochastic individual and time-speciﬁc
serially uncorrelated component 4ikt. The evolution of wjt, for all
j ∈ D, is non-stochastic,7 and known to the agents, who also know
the n × n matrix C of bilateral migration costs. We also assume that
individual i chooses her preferred location after having observed the
realizations of the stochastic component of utility at time t for all
countries.
We can obtain an analytic expression for the continuation payoff
Vt+1(k) in Eq. (1) by specifying the distributional assumptions on the
stochastic component of utility 4ikt. If we assume that the stochastic
component of utility follows an i.i.d. EVT-1 distribution (McFadden,
1974) with zero mean, i.e., F(4ikt) = e−e
−4ikt−c where c is Euler’s
constant, then Small and Rosen (1981) imply that the continuation
payoff can be recursively written as follows:
Vt+1(k) = ln
⎛
⎝∑
l∈D
ewlt+1−ckl+bVt+2(l)
⎞
⎠ (2)
6 The assumption that cjk is time-invariant is retained only to simplify the exposi-
tion of the theoretical model, but it is relaxed in the estimation.
7 This assumption, which has been introduced in inﬂuential dynamic discrete-
choice models (see, inter alia, Keane and Wolpin, 1997 and Lee, 2005) allows for
providing a clearer analytical derivation of the dependence of current bilateral migra-
tion rates on the future attractiveness of alternative destinations; the inclusion of a
stochastic aggregate component would complicate the model but would not alter the
insights that can be derived from it.
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The probability that the individual i will ﬁnd it optimal to move
from j to k at time t is given by:
pjkt =
ewkt−cjk+bVt+1(k)∑
l∈D
ewlt−cjl+bVt+1(l)
(3)
We let P(t) denote the n×n square matrix that describes the tran-
sition probabilities at time t among the elements of the choice set
D. Using Eq. (3) for period t + 1, we can decompose the continu-
ation payoff Vt+1(k) in Eq. (2) into two components, as Vt+1(k) =
wkt+1 + Yt+1(k), where wkt+1 represents the instantaneous payoff
in k at time t+ 1, and Yt+1(k) ≡ −ln(pkkt+1) > 0 is the value of the
option of leaving location k at time t + 1 (Artuç et al., 2010). If we
take the logarithm of the ratio of the probability of opting for coun-
try k over the probability of staying in country j in period t, with the
normalization cjj = 0, ∀j ∈ D, then we get:
ln
(
pjkt
pjjt
)
= wkt − wjt − cjk + b [Vt+1(k) − Vt+1( j)] (4)
The expression in Eq. (4) depends on: (i) the difference between
the deterministic component of utility at time t in k and in j only, (ii)
on the bilateral moving cost cjk, and on (iii) the difference in the dis-
counted value of the continuation payoffs. The continuation payoffs
depend on the future evolution of the attractiveness of all locations
in the choice set, and on the whole matrix C. The dependence of the
logarithm of the ratio of the two choice probabilities in Eq. (4) on
the future attractiveness and accessibility of other locations in the
choice set would disappear only if one of these two assumptions
holds: (i) individuals take myopic decisions, i.e., b = 0, (ii) there
are no migration costs, as this would imply that Vt+1(k) = Vt+1(j),
∀j, k ∈ D. If one of these two (implausible) assumptions does not hold,
then any estimation of the empirical counterpart of Eq. (4) that dis-
regards the term b[Vt+1(k)−Vt+1(j)] would be exposed to the threat
to identiﬁcation due to multilateral resistance to migration (Bertoli
and Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2013), as ln(pjkt/pjjt) also depends
on the (future) attractiveness of alternative destinations.
We want to estimate the empirical counterpart of Eq. (4), with
data on migration rates yjkt from multiple origins to a single desti-
nation (Germany, in our case) for t = 1, . . . , T. The inclusion of time
dummies dt allows us to control for the contemporary attractive-
ness wkt of the (single) destination country k and for the continua-
tion payoff Vt+1(k), while the time-invariant component of bilateral
migration cost cjk can be controlled through the inclusion of a vec-
tor of origin dummies dj.8 We assume that the instantaneous payoff
wjt can be modeled as a linear function of a vector of time-varying
origin-speciﬁc variables, i.e., wjt = a′xjt.9 We will ﬁrst estimate the
following regression, which we will refer to as the FE (ﬁxed effects)
speciﬁcation:10
ln(yjt) = a′xjt + 0t
′dt + 0j
′dj + ejt (5)
The error term in Eq. (5) is given by ejt = −bVt+1(j) + gjt; even
if we assume that gjt is well-behaved and orthogonal to xjt, the
estimates will be biased and inconsistent if we do not adequately
control for Vt+1(j). This threat to identiﬁcation arises because the
continuation payoff will be, in general, correlated with xjt, as Vt+1(j)
8 The estimation will also control for time-varying origin-speciﬁc components of
migration costs.
9 The inclusion of origin dummies dj also controls for the time-invariant component
of the attractiveness of each origin country.
10 We omit the subscript k from the bilateral migration rate from j to k as we have
one single destination.
is a function both of xjs and of xls, for any s ≥ t + 1 and l = j,
and the attractiveness of a destination is likely to evolve slowly over
time. This represents a relevant threat to identiﬁcation in our case,
as we will be focusing on a set of European countries that also rep-
resented relevant destinations for other countries in the region and
that experienced an economic crisis with relevant shared compo-
nents between 2008 and 2014. In such a case, the direct effect of,
say, a rise in the Italian unemployment on migration ﬂows from Italy
to Germany can be confounded by the simultaneous deterioration of
labor market conditions in Spain and by the anticipation of hystere-
sis in unemployment (e.g., Galí, 2015), which might have redirected
the ﬂow of Italian migrants from Spain to Germany. Thus, the mag-
nitude of the estimated effect for unemployment at origin would be
upward biased, as predicted also by Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas
Moraga (2013). More speciﬁcally, the presence of positive serial
and cross-sectional correlation in the regressors entails that the
biases arising from the estimation of the FE model are identical
irrespective of whether the true underlying theoretical model is a
static one with more general distributional assumptions as in Bertoli
and Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2013), or a dynamic one with i.i.d.
EVT-1 disturbances, as the one presented above, so that there is a
fundamental observational equivalence between the two.11
As shown in the online Appendix A.1, this threat to identiﬁcation
can be dealt with by relying on the Common Correlated Effects esti-
mator introduced by Pesaran (2006), 12 through the estimation of the
following regression:
ln(yjt) = a′xjt + 0t
′dt + 0j
′dj + kj ′
~
zt + gjt (6)
where the vector of auxiliary regressors z˜t is formed by the cross-
sectional averages of the dependent variable ln(yjt) and of all the
independent variables in the vector xjt. The estimation of Eq. (6),
which we will term the CCE (common correlated effects) speciﬁca-
tion, delivers an unbiased estimate of a even in the presence of the
confounding inﬂuence exerted by the future attractiveness of the
various options in the choice set, while Eq. (5), the FE speciﬁcation,
does not.13
If, at time t, we have data about a vector of variables qjt which
is informative about the variations in the future attractiveness of
the origin country j for s ≥ t + 1 with respect to its current attrac-
tiveness, then we could augment either of the two Eqs. (5) or (6)
with these variables. This can provide suggestive evidence about the
extent to which current migration decisions respond to variations in
the anticipations about the future attractiveness of the origin coun-
try. This approach entails a departure from the theoretical model,
as we know that Vt+1(j) depends on the future attractiveness of all
locations rather than of j alone.
3. Data sources and descriptive statistics
We describe here the variables, together with the various data
sources they are drawn from, that we employ in our analysis of the
determinants of the bilateral migration ﬂows from all the countries
in the EU to Germany.
11 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the existence of this observa-
tional equivalence.
12 See Eberhardt et al. (2013) for a non-technical introduction to the CCE estimator.
13 Notice that Eq. (6) represents a generalization of Eq. (5), as including time dum-
mies dt is equivalent to including the vector of auxiliary regressors z˜t with a vector
of coeﬃcients that is invariant across origins; this entails that an F-test on the null
hypothesis that kj = k, ∀j ∈ D can guide us with respect to the selection of our
preferred speciﬁcation.
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3.1. Migration data
The data on gross migration inﬂows are derived from a spe-
cial data provision by the Federal Statistical Oﬃce (Statistisches
Bundesamt, 2015), which has been collecting monthly data series on
the arrivals of foreigners by country of origin, deﬁned as the country
of last residence before moving to Germany, since January 2006.14,15
We use data from January 2006 until September 2014, that is 105
monthly observations for each country of origin. These ﬁgures are
based on the population registers that are kept at themunicipal level.
Registration is mandatory in Germany, as stated by the German reg-
istration law approved in March 2002 (Melderechtsrahmengesetz).
The law does not subordinate the need to register to a minimum
duration or to the scope of the stay, though there are exceptions
for foreign citizens whose intended duration of stay in Germany is
below two months, so that tourists do not have an obligation to
register.
The inscription in the local population registry is a necessary
precondition to obtain the income tax card that is required to sign
any employment contract (including for seasonal work), to issue
an invoice if self-employed and to rent a ﬂat, as landlords usually
require a proof that their would-be tenants have registered. Further-
more, the municipalities have an incentive to record new residents
properly since their tax revenues depend on the number of regis-
tered inhabitants, so that fees are levied against the persons who
do not comply with the mandatory registration. This ensures not
only that immigrants register, but also that they do so shortly after
their arrival, so that the ﬁgures from Statistisches Bundesamt (2015)
give us an accurate representation of the timing of gross bilateral
migration ﬂows.16
Our main sample is thus composed by 27 origin countries, whose
bilateral gross migration ﬂows are observed over 105 months, i.e.,
27 × 105 = 2, 835 observations, with the total number of arrivals
of foreigners that entered into Germany over the period standing
at 4,391,282. EU origins represent 63.5% of total gross inﬂows of
migrants to Germany over our period of analysis. Fig. 1 plots the
seasonally adjusted17 monthly gross migration ﬂows from the coun-
tries in our sample to Germany over our period of analysis. Gross
inﬂows ﬂuctuated approximately between 25,000 and 30,000 per
month until 2010, when the gross ﬂows started to increasemarkedly,
reaching by 2014 levels that were more than twice as large as they
used to be over the 2006–2009 period. The main country of origin
in absolute terms is represented by Poland (1,319,035 migrants over
the period), followed by Romania (740,675) and Bulgaria (348,035).
Some of the countries that have been more severely hit by the crisis
also sent large numbers of migrants to Germany, with Italy being the
ﬁfth largest origin (285,081 migrants), Spain the sixth (165,419) and
Greece the seventh (159,346).
The dependent variable in our econometric analysis is repre-
sented by the log of the bilateral migration rate from each origin
country to Germany. We draw the information on the mid-year
size of the population at origin, which is used for deﬁning our
14 The inﬂows of the so-called ethnic Germans (Spätaussiedler) are not included, as
they are reported together with the number of German returnees; all our results are
robust to the inclusion of German returnees and ethnic Germans in the deﬁnition of
the size of incoming bilateral migration ﬂows.
15 As usual with migration data derived from population registers, the same individ-
ual can be counted more than once; with a minor abuse of terminology, we will be
referring to the number of arrivals as the number of incoming migrants.
16 The limited incidence of informal employment in Germany suggests that the num-
ber of illegal migrants not covered by this administrative data source for the countries
of origin is likely to be small, even at the time in which the mobility of labor from
some countries was subject to legal restrictions, as discussed in Section 3.3 below; no
European country is among the top ten of the largest irregular communities according
to the estimates provided by Schneider (2012) and Vogel and Assner (2011).
17 See the description of how we seasonally adjust variables below.
dependent variable and to weigh the observations in our sample,18
from Eurostat (2015c).
3.2. Current economic conditions
We rely on seasonally adjusted data on unemployment rates,
measured at a monthly frequency, as a measure of the current eco-
nomic conditions for each country in our sample. The data come
from Eurostat (2015b). Real GDP ﬁgures are available only at a
lower, i.e., quarterly, frequency, and this motivates our choice of the
unemployment rate as a measure of current economic conditions.19
3.3. Migration policies
The sample of origin countries included in our empirical analysis
is composed by the 27 countries that, together with Germany, were
members of the European Union by 2014. Bulgaria and Romania
joined the EU in January 2007, while the accession of Croatia dates
to January 2014. The citizens of eight of the countries that joined the
EU in May 2004 (namely Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia) were subject to a
transitional period that imposed restrictions on the free movement
of labor to Germany that came to an end in May 2011,20 and a simi-
lar seven-year transitional period for Bulgaria and Romania ended in
January 2014. We build dummies to keep track of these institutional
and policy changes, which are also reported in Fig. 1, that can inﬂu-
ence the time proﬁle of gross migration inﬂows from some of the
origin countries in our sample to Germany.
3.4. Expectations
We introduce two main proxies for the anticipations about the
future attractiveness of the origin countries in our sample. First, we
rely on monthly data from Consumer Surveys by the European Com-
mission to have information on the anticipations about the evolution
of various dimensions of the economic situation over the next 12
months for each country (European Commission, 2015). Speciﬁcally,
we employ the synthetic measure of expectations that aggregates
anticipations about (i) the household ﬁnancial position, (ii) general
economic situation of the country, (iii) the number of unemployed
people, and (iv) the likelihood of saving money.21 This variable,
which is described in detail in Appendix A.2, is given by the arith-
metic average of the indicator concerning each of these four aspects,
which ranges between −100, when all respondents anticipate a very
negative evolution, and 100, which correspond to very favorable
anticipations reported by all respondents.
The second proxy for expectations that is used in our analysis
is represented by the yields on the secondary market of govern-
ment bonds with a residual maturity of 10 years, which are drawn
from the European Central Bank (2015).22 Theevolution of sovereign
bond yields reﬂects the evolution of three main factors: the real
18 As it is common in the literature, this the logarithm of the ratio between the gross
ﬂow of migrants from j to k at time t over the size of the total population at origin at
time t; this deﬁnition drives a wedge with the theoretical model, as the denominator
of the ratio should actually be represented by the portion of the population that chose
to stay at origin at time t, while the total population also includes immigrants and
returnees. We provide evidence below that this proxy of the theoretically relevant
concept does not inﬂuence our estimates.
19 All our results are robust to the inclusion of real GDP among the regressors.
20 Cyprus and Malta also joined the EU in 2004 but the right to the free movement
of labor was immediately granted to their citizens.
21 All our results are robust to the use of the monthly data on the Economic Senti-
ment Indicator by the European Commission, which is built combining expectations
on the evolution of business conditions in four distinct sectors (industry, services, con-
struction, and retail trade) with the measure of consumers’ conﬁdence that we use in
the analysis; results are available from the authors upon request.
22 See Appendix A.3 for further details on this variable.
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Fig. 1. Seasonally-adjusted monthly gross migration ﬂows to Germany from EU countries.
interest rate, the expected inﬂation rate, and the risk premium. The
relationship between a variation in the sovereign bond yields and
the expectations about future economic conditions is, in general,
ambiguous, as an increase in the real interest rate due to sustained
economic growth or an increase in the risk premium demanded by
investors convey opposite signals. Nevertheless, such an ambiguity
did not apply to European countries over our period of analysis, as
the economic crisis in Europe was characterized by important ﬂuc-
tuations in the interest rate on government bonds mostly due to
variations in the risk premium, with increases being associated with
the expectation of a ﬁscal consolidation, which induced a deteri-
oration of macroeconomic conditions (Blanchard and Leigh, 2013).
To strengthen this argument, Fig. 2 plots the evolution of the syn-
theticmeasure of consumers’ conﬁdence and the 10-year bond yields
between January 2006 and September 2014 for Greece, one of the
countries that was most severely hit by the crisis. The similarity
in the time proﬁle of the two series is remarkable, as the surge
in the interest rate recorded after January 2010 is associated with
a marked deterioration in the expectations about future economic
conditions in Greece, while the famous speech by Mario Draghi, on
July 26, 2012,23 is followed by a decline in interest rates and an
improvement in expectations. The association between these two
proxies for expectations is not limited to the Greek case, as a mul-
tivariate analysis with origin and month ﬁxed effects reveals that a
1% increase in bond yields is associated with a −0.39 % (s.e. 0.01)
reduction in the synthetic measure of consumer conﬁdence. This, in
turn, justiﬁes our hypothesis that a rise in the yields of sovereign
bonds is associated with the expectation of deteriorating economic
conditions.
23 “Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the
euro. And believe me, it will be enough.” (source: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/
key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html, accessed on June 2, 2015).
3.5. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for bilateral migration
rates, unemployment rates, consumer conﬁdence and the 10-year
bond yields, separately for each of the origin countries in our sam-
ple and as a population-weighted average over the entire sample.
Table 1 reveals that some Eastern European countries (namely Bul-
garia, Romania, Hungary and Poland) recorded the highest average
monthly migration rates to Germany over our period of analysis. If
we consider the yearly migration, this stood on average at 0.10 ×
12 = 1.2 per thousand over our sample of origin countries according
to Table 1.
We also see how the various origin countries in our sample expe-
rienced major differences both in the level and in the variability
(as reﬂected by the difference between the highest and the lowest
value) with respect to the other variables included in the analy-
sis: the unemployment rate reached 26.3 and 28.0% respectively for
Spain and Greece, while all countries in the sample except Den-
mark, Finland and Sweden had, on average, negative expectations
on the evolution of their economic situation. The yields on 10-year
government bonds also greatly differed across countries, with peaks
that exceeded (at times greatly so) 10% for seven out of 27 origin
countries.
4. Estimates
We describe in detail the exact speciﬁcations that we will be tak-
ing to the data before proceedingwith the results, andwe discuss the
expected direction of the bias in the estimation of the various coef-
ﬁcients that is due to the threats to identiﬁcation to which Eq. (5) is
exposed.
First, the vector xjt includes: (i) the logarithm of the unem-
ployment rate at origin, (ii) a dummy that identiﬁes whether the
origin j was a EU member at time t (EU accession variable), (iii) a
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Fig. 2. Consumer conﬁdence and 10-year bond yields for Greece.
dummy that identiﬁes whether the citizens of the origin j bene-
ﬁted from no restrictions on their movement to Germany at time
t (free mobility variable). In some speciﬁcation we also include (iv)
the logarithm of either of our two proxies for expectations, namely
consumer conﬁdence or the 10-year bond yields. Changes in current
economic conditions or in expectations about their future evolu-
tion need not produce an instantaneous effect on bilateral migration
ﬂows to Germany, so that the vector xjt in Eqs. (5) and (6) should
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Migration rate Unemployment rate Consumer conﬁdence Bond yields
Country Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max.
All origins 0.10 0.00 1.14 9.58 3.1 28.0 −19.23 −83.8 28.0 4.42 0.96 29.24
Austria 0.11 0.06 0.18 4.50 3.5 5.3 −1.39 −23.0 16.3 3.26 1.22 4.80
Belgium 0.02 0.01 0.05 7.84 6.8 8.8 −9.09 −26.5 2.9 3.54 1.30 4.85
Bulgaria 0.45 0.05 1.14 9.60 5.1 13.2 −36.87 −50.1 −20.8 4.94 3.11 7.77
Croatia 0.28 0.09 1.10 12.69 7.6 18.2 −33.81 −51.5 −14.0 5.72 3.57 8.64
Cyprus 0.04 0.00 0.21 8.17 3.2 16.8 −38.48 −64.4 −25.2 5.28 3.96 7.00
Czech Republic 0.07 0.02 0.15 6.41 4.2 7.8 −12.09 −31.2 3.9 3.59 1.21 5.45
Denmark 0.04 0.01 0.07 5.90 3.1 7.9 10.13 −7.4 20.4 2.95 0.96 4.82
Estonia 0.06 0.02 0.16 9.49 4.0 19.0 −7.48 −38.0 12.8 5.38 4.97 6.24
Finland 0.03 0.01 0.10 7.72 6.2 8.8 11.15 −6.4 23.8 3.09 1.13 4.78
France 0.02 0.01 0.04 9.10 7.2 10.3 −20.16 −37.0 1.8 3.26 1.35 4.73
Greece 0.14 0.04 0.35 15.73 7.3 28.0 −54.41 −83.8 −21.7 9.24 3.60 29.24
Hungary 0.30 0.09 0.64 9.36 7.1 11.4 −40.18 −68.8 −10.4 7.29 4.33 11.65
Ireland 0.03 0.01 0.08 10.61 4.3 15.1 −13.31 −32.1 13.9 5.16 1.65 11.70
Italy 0.05 0.02 0.13 8.73 5.8 12.9 −22.99 −41.5 −8.7 4.47 2.40 7.06
Latvia 0.24 0.04 0.53 12.47 5.5 20.6 −20.00 −54.9 1.0 6.22 2.28 13.76
Lithuania 0.18 0.06 0.36 11.02 4.0 18.3 −18.01 −56.1 9.2 5.70 2.42 14.50
Luxembourg 0.41 0.19 1.00 4.98 4.0 6.0 −2.79 −20.7 11.0 3.14 0.98 5.01
Netherlands 0.05 0.03 0.08 5.25 3.6 7.9 −3.82 −30.2 20.3 3.09 1.15 4.73
Poland 0.33 0.11 0.59 9.77 6.8 16.1 −18.56 −35.9 −0.5 5.32 3.10 6.45
Portugal 0.06 0.02 0.13 12.03 8.5 17.5 −40.15 −60.1 −23.3 6.00 3.18 13.85
Romania 0.35 0.05 1.05 6.70 5.5 7.2 −33.38 −63.3 −10.6 7.09 4.09 11.46
Slovak Republic 0.17 0.06 0.33 12.90 8.7 15.0 −19.74 −45.4 6.6 4.13 1.57 5.42
Slovenia 0.12 0.03 0.37 7.20 4.2 10.7 −23.78 −46.1 −4.1 4.62 2.66 6.90
Spain 0.03 0.01 0.12 17.89 7.9 26.3 −21.57 −47.6 −3.9 4.43 2.16 6.80
Sweden 0.02 0.01 0.05 7.54 5.6 9.3 12.84 −10.0 28.0 2.93 1.33 4.45
United Kingdom 0.01 0.01 0.03 6.84 5.0 8.4 −12.15 −35.2 7.6 3.53 1.65 5.43
Malta 0.03 0.00 0.20 6.47 5.9 7.3 −24.44 −41.3 1.4 4.19 2.32 5.28
Notes: 105 monthly observations on 27 countries between January 2006 and September 2014; migration rate deﬁned as 1000 times monthly gross inﬂows over population at
origin; consumer conﬁdence varies between −100 and 100; bond yields in percentage points; the means for all origins are population-weighted.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Statistisches Bundesamt (2015), Eurostat (2015a,b,c), European Commission (2015) and European Central Bank (2015).
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Table 2
Determinants of bilateral migration to Germany (2006–2014).
Dependent variable Log of the bilateral migration rate to Germany
Expectations variable Consumer conﬁdence Bond yields
Model FE CCE FE CCE FE CCE
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log unemployment rate 0.871 0.538 0.847 0.475 0.628 0.394
(four lags) [0.021] [0.027] [0.022] [0.029] [0.020] [0.033]
Log expectations −0.110 −0.137 0.460 0.121
(four lags) [0.024] [0.020] [0.015] [0.016]
EU accession 1.207 1.042 1.195 0.907 1.136 1.039
[0.041] [0.065] [0.041] [0.082] [0.035] [0.073]
Free mobility 0.239 0.304 0.236 0.384 0.205 0.340
[0.019] [0.026] [0.019] [0.033] [0.016] [0.029]
CCE test (p-value) 47.18 (0.00) 34.27 (0.00) 24.57 (0.00)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin seasonal dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auxiliary regressors No Yes No Yes No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.975 0.994 0.975 0.995 0.982 0.995
Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27
Observations 2835 2835 2835 2835 2835 2835
Notes: standard errors in brackets (all results signiﬁcant below 1%); observations weighted by population at origin; the coeﬃcients on the four-lags variables are the long-run
coeﬃcients; CCE speciﬁcations include the cross-sectional averages of the dependent and independent variables interacted with origin ﬁxed effects as auxiliary regressors; the
null of the CCE test (F-test) is that the coeﬃcients of the cross-sectional averages included as auxiliary regressors do not vary across origins.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on the data presented in Section 3.
also include some lagged terms. We follow Canova (2007), selecting
the optimal number of lags by running successive LR tests on drop-
ping higher order lags.24 The result is that we include four lags of
the three variables, i.e., the unemployment rate and the two proxies
for expectations, in our monthly data regressions. What we report
below is the long-run coeﬃcient associated to each speciﬁcation,
that is, the sum of the lags for each of the variables.25 We also rely
on lower frequency, i.e., quarterly and yearly, data to estimate our
model, in order to address the concern that our estimated elasticities
with monthly data do not capture the full response of international
migration ﬂows to variations in their underlying determinants. The
elasticities estimated with quarterly and yearly data are in line with,
and not statistically different from, those obtained with monthly
data, and this is reassuring with respect to our choice to rely on high-
frequency data for the estimation, which allows us to better capture
sharp variations in the attractiveness or accessibility of the various
locations in the choice set.26
Second, we include a rich variety of ﬁxed effects when estimat-
ing Eqs. (5) and (6), which allows us to control for many unobserved
determinants of bilateral migration ﬂows. In particular, we include
time dummies (dt). These dummies absorb any German-speciﬁc vari-
ation in the data, as well as common elements across countries of
origin over time. For instance, the effect of current German eco-
nomic conditions or German general migration policies is absorbed
by our time ﬁxed effects. Importantly, the time dummies dt also
absorb the inﬂuence of the continuation payoff Vt+1(k) on ln(yjt). We
also include origin-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects (dj), which control for time-
invariant bilateral determinants of migration ﬂows to Germany, such
as cultural, linguistic and geographical distance. The origin dum-
mies dj also absorb the effect of any bilateral policy or institutional
24 The highest number of lags that we included was four, as Canova (2007) suggests
to include a number of lags that does not exceed T1/3, with this limit being 4.7 in our
dataset with T = 105 observations for each country; both the Akaike and Bayesian
Information Criteria select the same number of lags.
25 All of our results hold if we also add lags of the dependent variable; the results are
available from the authors upon request.
26 Yearly data allow us to estimate only FE speciﬁcations, while quarterly data have
a longitudinal dimension that allow us to run also CCE speciﬁcations; results are
available from the authors upon request.
variable that does not vary over our period of analysis.27 Our origin-
speciﬁc ﬁxed effects also partly control for slowlymoving bilateral or
origin-speciﬁc variables, such as the demographic composition of the
population at origin, that barely changed between 2006 and 2014.
The origin dummies dj might be only partly controlling for the inﬂu-
ence onmigration ﬂows exerted bymigration networks, as the size of
some communities of European migrants in Germany substantially
increased over our period of analysis. We control for this confound-
ing effect through the inclusion of interactions between the origin
ﬁxed effects dj and dummies for sub-periods of our dataset in some
of our speciﬁcations.28
Finally, we also control for country-speciﬁc seasonal patterns in
the data (also included in xjt). While the inclusion of these controls
does not affect our results, they improve the ﬁt of themodels that we
present. Thus, we add origin-country times month-of-the-year ﬁxed
effects to absorb these origin-speciﬁc seasonal patterns.29 The rich
structure of ﬁxed effects that we rely upon for the estimation of both
Eqs. (5) and (6) implies that the identifying variation comes from the
correlation between the origin-speciﬁc evolution of the seasonally
adjusted dependent variable and of the seasonally adjusted regres-
sors, net of common time effects.30 In our preferred speciﬁcations,
we weight observations by the population of the origin country,31
27 As the citizens of all countries in our sample beneﬁted from a visa waiver for
non-immigrant admission to Germany throughout our period of analysis, then ori-
gin dummies also absorb in this case the effect produced by bilateral visa policies on
bilateral migration ﬂows (Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2015).
28 Speciﬁcally, we will introduce interactions between dj and dummies for four sub-
periods of roughly equal length (26 months for the ﬁrst three sub-periods and 27
months for the last one) of our sample.
29 This is equivalent to ﬁrst regressing separately the dependent and each of the
independent variables (including the auxiliary regressors for the CCE estimation) on
the interaction between origin dummies and month-of-the-year dummies, and then
estimating the model on the residuals generated by these regressions; this is what we
mean when we refer to seasonally adjusted data.
30 The inclusion of interactions between origin dummies and dummies for time sub-
periods in some speciﬁcations further reduces the identifying variation, removing the
variability across sub-periods for each origin.
31 This is the theoretically relevant speciﬁcation since it ensures that the location
decision of each individual is weighted in the same way, independently of her coun-
try of origin; Bertoli and Fernández-Huertas Moraga (2013) or Hanson and McIntosh
(2012), among others, follow this approach.
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Table 3
Determinants of bilateral migration to Germany (2006–2014), controlling for origin-speciﬁc time-varying unobservables.
Dependent variable Log of the bilateral migration rate to Germany
Expectations variable Consumer conﬁdence Bond yields
Model FE CCE FE CCE FE CCE
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log unemployment rate 0.529 0.502 0.504 0.422 0.501 0.396
(four lags) [0.028] [0.040] [0.028] [0.045] [0.028] [0.047]
Log expectations −0.098 −0.079 0.166 0.087
(four lags) [0.019] [0.028] [0.016] [0.019]
EU accession 0.789 0.999 0.794 0.919 0.798 1.004
[0.027] [0.068] [0.027] [0.086] [0.027] [0.078]
Free mobility 0.241 0.305 0.233 0.325 0.253 0.310
[0.017] [0.026] [0.017] [0.034] [0.016] [0.030]
CCE test (p-value) 6.52 (0.00) 4.88 (0.00) 4.56 (0.00)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin seasonal dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin-period dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auxiliary regressors No Yes No Yes No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.993 0.995 0.993 0.995 0.994 0.996
Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27
Observations 2835 2835 2835 2835 2835 2835
Notes: origin-period dummies are interactions of origin and four sub-periods of our sample: January 2006 to February 2008, March 2008 to April 2010, May 2010 to June 2012
and July 2012 to September 2014; see also the notes to Table 2.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on the data presented in Section 3.
although this choice does not inﬂuence the results that we obtained,
as shown below in Section 4.2.
The two gravity equations deliver consistent estimates under
different assumptions of the dynamic discrete choice model that
describes the location-decision problem that potentialmigrants face;
speciﬁcally, the derivation of Eq. (5) rests on the assumption that
either migrants are myopic, as they disregard the future implications
of their current location choices, or that there are no migration costs.
If neither of these two implausible assumptions hold, then we can
obtain consistent estimates through the estimation of Eq. (6), where
we control for the threat to identiﬁcation posed by the dependence
of the current bilateral migration rate on the future attractiveness of
all potential destination countries. This threat might be particularly
relevant in this context, as several major migrant-recipient countries
were severely affected by the economic crisis.
4.1. Main speciﬁcations
Column (1) of Table 2 reports the results obtained from the esti-
mation of Eq. (5). The interpretation of the long-run coeﬃcient is
straightforward: a 1% increase in the unemployment rate at origin is
associated with a 0.87% increase in the emigration rate to Germany.
The policy variables are also remarkable. Granting free mobility at
the end of the transitional period was associated with an increase in
the migration rate to Germany equal to e0.239 − 1 ≈ 27%, whereas
the migration rate from Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia more than
tripled (e1.207 − 1 ≈ 234% increase) after these countries became EU
members.
The identiﬁcation of these estimates is threatened by the fact that
we are not controlling for the possible dependence of the current
bilateral migration rates on the future attractiveness of alternative
destinations, which represents a speciﬁc cause of multilateral resis-
tance to migration. We tackle this threat to identiﬁcation by adding
the vector of auxiliary regressors z˜t interacted with origin dummies
dj in the speciﬁcation presented in Column (2) of Table 2.32 The
value of the F-test on the assumption that the inclusion of these
auxiliary regressors is actually unnecessary is 47.18, thus strongly
32 For this speciﬁcation, this requires to estimate 189 additional coeﬃcients, corre-
sponding to 27 origin-speciﬁc coeﬃcients for each of the seven auxiliary regressors.
rejecting the null that reﬂects the hypothesis that the origin-speciﬁc
coeﬃcients of the cross-sectional averages do not vary across ori-
gins. The rejection of the null suggests that the estimated elasticity
for the unemployment rate in Column (1) may be biased. This is
what the comparison of the estimates in Columns (1) and (2) actually
reveals: the long-run elasticities of migration rates to Germany with
respect to origin-country unemployment rates go down from 0.87 to
0.54, a 38% reduction that signals that the previous estimate was, as
expected, upward biased. Column (2) in Table 2 provides a consistent
estimate of the effects of unemployment rates at origin on migra-
tion rates to Germany,33 even if we have omitted relevant observable
or unobservable determinants of migration ﬂows to Germany, and it
thus represents our preferred speciﬁcation.
Regarding our policy variables, we know that migration policies
are generally coordinated at the European level. For example, the
lifting of free mobility restrictions on workers for the citizens of
the 2004 Enlargement countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) in May 2011 took
place at the same time in Germany and in most of the other origi-
nal EU member states.34 This suggests that the estimated effect for
this variable from Column (1) in Table 2 might be downward biased,
since the coeﬃcient would simultaneously pick up both the posi-
tive direct effect on migration to Germany coming from lifting these
restrictions and the negative indirect effect onmigration to Germany
coming from the simultaneous lifting of restrictions on alternative
destinations, such as France. This is indeed the direction of the bias
that we uncover for the free mobility dummy. The effect of this vari-
able increases from 27% to e0.304 − 1 ≈ 36% in Column (2). For the
same reason, we would have expected the estimate on the EU acces-
sion dummy to be larger in Column (2) than in Column (1), while
this is not actually the case, although the difference is not signiﬁcant
at conventional conﬁdence levels. We will come back to this issue
33 While we cannot purely establish causality, the endogeneity generated by reverse
causality between changes in migration rates at the monthly level and changes in
unemployment is likely to be irrelevant for most countries in the sample, given
that migration rates to Germany do not generally affect great shares of the origin
population.
34 Ireland, the United Kingdom and Sweden had not introduced temporary restric-
tions on the free mobility of the citizens of the countries that joined the EU in May
2004.
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Table 4
Determinants of bilateral migration to Germany (2006–2014), no weights.
Dependent variable Log of the bilateral migration rate to Germany
Expectations variable Consumer conﬁdence Bond yields
Model FE CCE FE CCE FE CCE
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log unemployment rate 0.726 0.557 0.673 0.506 0.483 0.389
(four lags) [0.024] [0.041] [0.025] [0.048] [0.025] [0.061]
Log expectations −0.181 −0.162 0.416 0.131
(four lags) [0.028] [0.036] [0.021] [0.034]
EU accession 1.150 1.043 1.141 0.945 1.104 1.025
[0.047] [0.060] [0.046] [0.076] [0.043] [0.081]
Free mobility 0.354 0.332 0.366 0.450 0.339 0.338
[0.022] [0.051] [0.022] [0.065] [0.020] [0.062]
CCE test (p-value) 17.85 (0.00) 11.76 (0.00) 9.96 (0.00)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin seasonal dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auxiliary regressors No Yes Yo Yes Yo Yes
Adjusted R2 0.950 0.978 0.951 0.978 0.957 0.979
Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27
Observations 2835 2835 2835 2835 2835 2835
Notes: see Table 2.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on the data presented in Section 3.
when discussing Table 3. Still, the effect of the EU accession dummy
is remarkably large in the CCE speciﬁcation: e1.042−1 ≈ 183% increase
in migration to Germany from Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia after
entering the EU.
The estimates in Column (2) are already free from the threat to
identiﬁcation posed by the explicit consideration of expectations,
but it is also interesting per se to gain an understanding of the role
played by expectations in the decision to migrate to Germany, rather
than just treating them as a nuisance. Thus, in Columns (3) to (6) in
Table 2, we add (four lags of) our two measures of expectations: ﬁrst
the log of the general consumer conﬁdence index in each our our ori-
gin countries in Columns (3) and (4), and second the log of the yields
on sovereign bonds with a residual maturity of 10 years for each of
our origin countries in Columns (5) and (6).
The estimates in the third data column reveal that a 10% increase
in consumer conﬁdence at origin is associated with a 1.1% decrease
in the bilateral migration rate to Germany. Interestingly, the inclu-
sion of our proxy for expectations barely affects the rest of estimated
coeﬃcients in Column (1). This suggests, as our theory predicts, that
the inclusion of a direct estimate for expectations at origin is not
enough to remove the bias due to the omission of proper controls for
the value of the continuation payoff Vt+1(j) from staying at origin.
The reason is twofold: ﬁrst, Vt+1(j) depends in a highly non-linear
way of the expectations at origin; second, the continuation payoff
at origin also depends on expectations about the evolution of the
attractiveness of all alternative destinations for potential migrants.
Given these considerations, we turn to Column (4), where we
apply the CCE estimator to the augmented model, including both the
lags of the consumer conﬁdence variable and their cross-sectional
averages interacted with origin ﬁxed effects. The coeﬃcient on the
consumer conﬁdence variable remains statistically at the same level
as the one in Column (3): −0.14 versus −0.11. For the other vari-
ables, the estimates in Column (3) reveal substantial biases, which
we abstain from commenting since they are identical to the differ-
ence between the simpler models in Columns (1) and (2). The need
for the CCE estimator is conﬁrmed by the F-test, which stands at
34.27, thus clearly rejecting the null.
When comparing Columns (2) and (4) in Table 2, which have both
been estimated with the CCE methodology, we observe that the esti-
mate on the unemployment rate goes down from 0.54 to 0.48 once
we introduce our ﬁrst proxy for expectations. The reason is that our
proxy for expectations is correlated with the unemployment rate
(−0.40 in raw terms and −0.19 net of ﬁxed effects) so that when the
unemployment rate is considered in isolation, it picks up the effect
both of current economic conditions and of current conditions cor-
related with future expectations. In Column (4), part of this second
effect is absorbed by our proxy for expectations.35
Columns (5) and (6) repeat the exercise from Columns (3) and
(4) by adding a different measure of expectations: the 10-year bond
yields. The estimate from Column (5) reveal that a 10% rise in the 10-
year bond yields was associated in this period with a 4.6% increase in
the emigration rate of that country to Germany. In this case, the coef-
ﬁcient on the effect of the unemployment rate goes notably down
with respect to Column (1): from 0.87 to 0.63. This is not enough
to absorb all the bias with respect to our preferred speciﬁcation in
Column (2) but the change goes in the expected direction, suggest-
ing that the type of expectations associated with the evolution of the
bond yields over the period could be more correlated with the con-
tinuation payoff in the origin country than the consumer conﬁdence
variable. In the case of the CCE speciﬁcation, this time we see that
the FE estimates were biased both for the unemployment rate, which
goes from 0.63 to 0.39, and for our proxy for expectations, the bond
yields, from 0.46 to 0.12. Again, the joint effect of the unemployment
and bond yields variable in this speciﬁcation is comparable to the
isolated effect of the unemployment variable in Column (2).
4.2. Robustness checks
We present some relevant robustness checks on our results,
where (i) we more fully control for additional omitted unobservable
variables through a richer structure of ﬁxed effects, (ii) we do not
weight observations, and (iii) we rely on alternativemeasures of pop-
ulation at origin. For all pointswe report the FE and the CCE estimates
including the rate of unemployment at origin, our two expectations
variables and immigration policy variables.
First, we include the interaction between the origin dummies dj
and dummies for four sub-periods of our sample: three sub-periods
of 26 months (January 2006 to February 2008, March 2008 to April
35 The same thing happens when we add other variables proxying for current eco-
nomic conditions; for example, if we add the GDP per capita as an explanatory
variable, its correlationwith the unemployment ratemakes it pick up part of the effect
of current economic conditions. Results available from the authors upon request.
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Table 5
Determinants of bilateral migration to Germany (2006–2014), alternative population.
Dependent variable Log of the bilateral migration rate to Germany
Expectations variable Consumer conﬁdence Bond yields
Model FE CCE FE CCE FE CCE
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log unemployment rate 0.869 0.521 0.844 0.457 0.624 0.378
(four lags) [0.021] [0.028] [0.022] [0.029] [0.020] [0.033]
Log expectations −0.118 −0.142 0.473 0.123
(four lags) [0.024] [0.020] [0.016] [0.017]
EU accession 1.212 1.043 1.199 0.906 1.141 1.035
[0.041] [0.067] [0.041] [0.086] [0.035] [0.076]
Free mobility 0.233 0.303 0.228 0.385 0.198 0.341
[0.019] [0.026] [0.019] [0.033] [0.016] [0.029]
CCE test (p-value) 48.18 (0.00) 34.85 (0.00) 24.59 (0.00)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Origin seasonal dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Auxiliary regressors No Yes No Yes No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.974 0.994 0.974 0.995 0.981 0.995
Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27
Observations 2835 2835 2835 2835 2835 2835
Notes: migration rates computed using population 15 to 49; see also the notes to Table 2.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on the data presented in Section 3.
2010, May 2010 to June 2012) and a fourth sub-period of 27 months
(July 2012 to September 2014). This greatly reduces the variability
that we use for identiﬁcation, allowing us to better control for the
effects of time-varying migration networks at destination and other
potential time-varying confounders. This is just an example of many
possible subdivisions of the sample: we can also divide it in two,
three, ﬁve or six sub-periods without any effect on our main CCE
estimates.36
We present the results with four sub-periods because they still
allow us to identify the effects of the policy variables, which happen
to be right in themiddle of our 2-years-and-2-months divisions: Jan-
uary 2007 for the EU accession of Romania and Bulgaria, May 2011
for the free mobility access of Eastern enlargement workers and Jan-
uary 2014 both for the Croatian EU accession and for the end of free
mobility restrictions on Romanians and Bulgarians. In this sense, we
identify the policy effects by comparing the evolution of the bilat-
eral migration rate, controlling for the role of expectations in our CCE
speciﬁcation, roughly one year before the change and one year after
the change in each of our origin countries.
The results are presented in Table 3. We ﬁrst remark the decrease
in the FE estimate for the association between the unemployment
rate at origin and the bilateral migration rate to Germany. It changes
from 0.87 in Column (1) of Table 2 to 0.53 in Column (1) of Table 3.
This means that this structure of ﬁxed effects is able to eliminate
the bias in the estimation of the effect of the unemployment rate on
migration rates. The CCE estimate remains robust in the new spec-
iﬁcation, with a point estimate at 0.50 that cannot be distinguished
statistically from the 0.54 estimate in Column (2) of Table 2. How-
ever, the policy variables remain biased in the FE speciﬁcation in
Table 3. The coeﬃcient on the free mobility variable remains at 0.24
while the unbiased CCE estimate is 0.31. The main change corre-
sponds to the EU accession dummy: it goes from 1.21 in Column
(1) of Table 2 to 0.79 in Column (1) of Table 3. On the contrary, the
CCE is robustly estimated at 1.00 in Column (2) of Table 3, not sta-
tistically different from 1.04 in Column (2) of Table 2. Thus, greatly
reducing the variability available for identiﬁcation and the scope for
unobservable variables has no effect on the CCE estimates, which
36 Results available from the authors upon request.
are consistent under a less restrictive description of the location-
decision problem that potential migrants face, but greatly affects the
FE estimates.
In addition, the inclusion of the origin-times-sub-period ﬁxed
effects has the virtue of solving the puzzle that the bias on the EU
accession dummy was posing in Table 2. In Table 3, the bias on the
EU accession dummy goes in the expected direction. Oncewe control
for the policy coordination, which is the fact that Romania, Bulgaria
and Croatia entered the EU not only with Germany but also with
other alternative destinations, we observe that the FE coeﬃcient was
downward biased, as predicted by the theory and as it was the case
with the free mobility dummy: the estimated effect of EU accession
on the bilateral migration rate increases from e0.789 − 1 ≈ 120% in
Column (1) to e0.999 − 1 ≈ 172% in Column (2) of Table 3, with the
difference between the two estimated coeﬃcients being signiﬁcant
at conventional conﬁdence levels.
Why does this richer structure of ﬁxed effects get rid of the bias
on the unemployment variable, but not on the policy variables? This
is just a matter of the strength of the residual correlation of these
variables across alternative destinations and dates in time. In this
particular application, the origin-sub-period ﬁxed effects happen to
absorb the correlation between the current unemployment rate and
the expectations about its evolution in the origin and in alterna-
tive destinations. In the case of the policy variables, the correlation
between the policies of Germany, France, the Netherlands, Italy and
many other EU countries is just perfect and biases the FE coeﬃ-
cients even under very demanding speciﬁcations.37 With respect to
Columns (3) to (6) in Table 3, they introduce the two measures of
expectations in the same way as Columns (3) to (6) from Table 2.
Again, the CCE results do not change except for a slight reduction on
the coeﬃcients on expectations while the FE speciﬁcations keep the
migration policy biases while notably reducing the biases on the rest
of variables.
Next, Table 4 repeats exactly the same speciﬁcations from Table 2,
but without using population weights. These unweighted results
37 One additional comment about column (2) in Table 3 has to do with the test for
the convenience of using the CCE estimator; the F-statistic (6.25) is much smaller than
the corresponding one in Column (2) of Table 2, which stood at 47.18, reﬂecting again
how the more demanding structure of ﬁxed effects reduces the scope for the role of
expectations although the test still clearly rejects the null.
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imply that the migration rate from Cyprus to Germany has the same
effect on the estimates as the migration rate from Poland to Ger-
many. Nevertheless, the lack of weights should not lead to biased
estimates given the large sample size and this is exactly what we
observe: none of the CCE coeﬃcients in Table 4 is statistically differ-
ent from their counterparts in Table 2. In contrast, some of the FE
estimates do not appear to be robust to the use of weights and we
can observe some large differences between Tables 2 and 4.
In Table 5, what we change from our benchmark speciﬁcations is
the deﬁnition of our dependent variable.38 Rather than calculating
the migration rate as a share of the total population of each coun-
try of origin in an origin year, which is our proxy for the number of
stayers, we divide the inﬂows by the part of the population that is
more likely to be mobile: individuals aged 15 to 49 in each of the ori-
gin countries. As in Table 4, the CCE results barely move with respect
to Table 2. The reason is that, even with this deﬁnition, the variation
in the bilateral migration rate is dominated by the changes in the
inﬂows rather than by the changes in the denominator.
5. Concluding remarks
Temporary migrations tend to be the rule rather than the excep-
tion. However, possibly due to a lack of appropriate data and analyti-
cal tools, themicro-foundations of gravity equations for international
migration have relied on static models that regard the decision to
migrate as permanent. This paper shows that this approach can
lead to an incorrect speciﬁcation of the gravity equation, even if
the stochastic component of location-speciﬁc utility is not correlated
across countries. A dynamic discrete choice model with a well-
behaved stochastic component of location-speciﬁc utility implies
that the ratio of the probability of opting for two countries at one
point in time depends on the future attractiveness and accessibility
of all possible locations, unless one assumes either that agents are
myopic or that the world is frictionless, i.e., there are no migration
costs, thus giving rise to multilateral resistance to migration (Bertoli
and Fernández-Huertas Moraga, 2013). If we disregard this depen-
dence, the estimation of the determinants of migration can produce
results that are biased in a direction that can be inferred from our
micro-foundations.
We take our dynamic migration model to the data with the esti-
mation of the determinants of Europeanmigration ﬂows to Germany
between January 2006 and September 2014. This period spans some
years before and after the Great Recession and its European after-
math and it also covers the accession of Bulgaria, Romania and
Croatia to the EU and the introduction of the freemovement of work-
ers to Germany for citizens from the countries of the ﬁrst and second
round of the EU’s Eastern enlargement. Our results are in line with
the predictions of the theory. First, our measure of current economic
conditions in origin countries, i.e., the unemployment rate, signiﬁ-
cantly affects migration ﬂows, but by less than what is obtained with
a speciﬁcation of the gravity equation derived from a static model.
Second, this more restrictive model substantially underestimates the
effect of migration policies on bilateral ﬂows. Hence, our empirical
analysis delivers important insights for policy makers on how insti-
tutional changes, namely the Eastern enlargement of the EU and the
end of the transitional arrangements, and the formation of expecta-
tions about the future in a period of rapid economic changes affect
the scale of migration ﬂows. Against the background of optimal cur-
rency area theory (Mundell, 1961), the ﬁndings of this paper provide
also new insights on labor mobility in the Eurozone.
38 We also change the population weights accordingly although this does not affect
the results; unfortunately, we do not have access to migration inﬂows by age cohorts.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2016.06.012.
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